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COMMENT

Iran, Democracy, and International Law
ABTEEN KARIMI†

INTRODUCTION
Every revolution is preceded by a state of general
exhaustion and takes place against a background of
unleashed aggressiveness. Authority cannot put up with a
nation that gets on its nerves; the nation cannot tolerate an
authority it has come to hate. Authority has squandered all
its credibility and has empty hands, the nation has lost the
final scrap of patience and makes a fist. A climate of
tension and increasing oppressiveness prevails. We start to
fall into a psychosis of terror. The discharge is coming. We
feel it.1
The tumultuous aftermath of Iran‘s disputed presidential election
and the three years of tension and turbulence since have sparked
renewed debate about the vitality of Iran‘s century old democratic
movement. The same social forces that sparked Iran‘s Constitutional
Revolution at the turn of the twentieth century, brought Prime
Minister Mossadegh to power in the 1950s, and overthrew the Shah
in 1979, have dramatically and unexpectedly forced the arc of
history. While Iran‘s democratic movement currently lingers in a
kind of ―political purgatory,‖2 the future trajectory of Iran‘s political
evolution towards a more representative government is a subject of
great interest and importance. Furthermore, the revolutionary wave
currently sweeping across the Arab world raises serious questions
†

Executive Articles Editor, Maryland Journal of International Law 2011–2012; J.D. University
of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, May 2012. The author wishes to thank his
parents for their love and support, and Professor Peter Danchin for his guidance and feedback.

1. RYSZARD KAPUŚCIŃSKI, SHAH OF SHAHS 104 (William R. Brand & Katarzyna
Mroczkowska-Brand trans., Vintage International 1992) (1985).
2. Carnegie Endowment, Taking Tehran‟s Temperature: One Year On, YOUTUBE (July
12, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2DvgQ8JkLVM.
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about the nature of democracy in the Middle East and the role
religion will play in the political architecture of Islamic societies.
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an increasing
trend towards regarding democracy as a universal norm under
international law as well as a trend towards international delegitimization of efforts by governments to subvert democratic
institutions and procedures.3 Numerous international covenants
drafted in the latter half of the twentieth century, such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the American
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), the African Charter on
Human and People‘s Rights (ACHPR), and the Charter of the
Organization of American States (OAS), increasingly form a body of
custom with respect to the universality of democratic norms.4
Many commentators, most famously Francis Fukuyama, have
argued that liberal democracy is not only a universally desirable norm
under international law, but the inevitable and final stage of human
sociopolitical development.5 Fukuyama‘s original essay dealt mainly
with the ideological death of Marxism-Leninism after the Cold War,
but Fukuyama has more recently expanded his thesis to discuss
Islamic fundamentalism, claiming that the appeal of radical Islamist
ideologies is limited, and that Muslim societies will either become
successful democracies like Turkey or will adopt a strict
interpretation of Sharia law and collapse in on themselves like
Afghanistan or Pakistan.6 Fukuyama‘s thesis is flawed, as Muslim
voters in countries such as Turkey, Egypt and Tunisia seem to see
little contradiction between Islam and participation in a generally
open and pluralistic society.7
After establishing that there exists an international legal norm in
favor of democracy, this paper will then proceed to discuss how the
present government of Iran, the Islamic Republic, has violated this

3. See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J.
INT‘L L. 46, 46 (1992).
4. See infra Part I.
5. See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992).
6. Francis Fukuyama, They Can Only Go So Far, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2008, at B1.
7. Recent elections in post-revolutionary Egypt and Tunisia, albeit somewhat flawed
and in Egypt‘s case led to broad majorities for the Muslim Brotherhood and the radical
Salafi movement, nonetheless represent the beginnings of modern civil society in the Arab
world.
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norm, most prominently its obligations under the terms of the ICCPR,
to which Iran has been a party since 1975.8 The ICCPR requires state
parties to hold periodic and genuine elections, provides guarantees
against arbitrary arrest and torture, and enshrines safeguards to ensure
due process.9 While Iran‘s present constitution contains many of
these protections, and ostensibly provides for regular, free elections,
the theocratic structures created by Iranian law and custom neuter
these guarantees.10 However, as scholars such as Alfred Stepan have
argued, the fact that a country‘s laws and customs enshrine religious
elements does not necessarily preclude the emergence of successful,
pluralistic democracies.11 Iran does not necessarily have to become a
rigidly secularist state on the Kemalist model to become a successful
democracy.12
I.

THE EMERGING NORM IN FAVOR OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

In 1992 Professor Thomas Franck published his landmark article
The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, in which he argued
that a growing body of treaty law and state practice were converging
to form an increasingly coherent international norm in favor of
democratic governance and the right to self-determination.13 Franck
cited two contemporary examples: (1) the international community‘s
overwhelmingly negative response to the overthrow of the
democratically elected government of President Jean Bertrand
Aristide in Haiti, and (2) the reaction of the Conference on Security
and Co-operation in Europe to the failed Soviet coup against Mikhail
Gorbachev.14 Franck also noted how regional organizations such as
8. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 25, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 179 (entered into force March 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
9. Id. arts. 7, 9, 14, 25.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See Alfred C. Stepan, Religion, Democracy and the “Twin Tolerations”, J.
DEMOCRACY, Oct. 2000, at 37.
12. See infra Part III.
13. Franck, supra note 3, at 47.
14. Id. at 46–47. In the aftermath of the failed 1991 coup attempt, the Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe passed a resolution ―condemning unreservedly forces
which seek to take power from a representative government of a participating State against
the will of the people as expressed in free and fair elections and contrary to the justly
established constitutional order‖ and ―supporting vigorously, in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations, in case of overthrow or attempted overthrow of a legitimately elected
government of a participating state by undemocratic means.‖ Conference on Security & Cooperation in Europe [CSCE], Document of the Moscow Meeting on the Human Dimension of
the CSCE, ¶¶ 17.1–.2, 30 I.L.M. 1670, 1677 (1991). The CSCE is the predecessor
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the OAS were increasingly taking action to condemn un-democratic
regimes and their conduct, citing the example of the OAS
condemnation of Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle for
his brutal efforts to suppress the Nicaraguan Revolution.15 For most
of the 20th century it seemed that cynical political calculations, often
related to the heated atmosphere surrounding Cold War politics,
rather than the democratic character of the government in question,
determined whether or not a particular government was recognized as
legitimate and thus empowered to represent the state
internationally.16
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has been an
increasingly universal customary international legal norm,
demonstrated by state practice and opinio juris, supporting
democratic governments against extra-constitutional seizures of
power. Until that time, there was a generally accepted understanding
that the internal character of a government was, as a matter of
international law, irrelevant to whether or not that government, as
distinct from the state, was to be considered legitimate.17 Recognition
of governments was considered as a bi-lateral question, resolved by
individual states according to a wide array of varying political
calculations.18
To the extent that international law prescribed any standard for
determining the legitimacy of a government, the most commonly
cited standard was the ―Effective Control‖ test embodied in the
Tinoco arbitration, which posited that there were several relevant
factors in determining the right of a government to bind a state
internationally:
The question is, has it [the government] really established
itself in such a way that all within its influence recognize its
organization to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Who We
Are, ORG. FOR SEC. AND CO-OPERATION IN EUR., http://www.osce.org/who/87 (last visited
Mar. 19, 2012).
15. Franck, supra note 3, at 65.
16. See generally Matthew Griffin, Accrediting Democracies: Does The Credentials
Committee of the United Nations Promote Democracy Through its Accreditation Process,
and Should It?, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 725 (2000) (discussing the debates in the United
Nations General Assembly concerning the right to represent Cambodia after the collapse of
the Khmer Rouge regime).
17. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
18. P.K. MENON, THE LAW OF RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BASIC PRINCIPLES
84–85 (1994).
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control, and that there is no opposing force assuming to be
a government in its place? Is it discharging its functions as
a government usually does, respected within its own
jurisdiction?19
Indeed, commentators such as Nehal Bhuta have noted that:
The problem of any new political order is the problem that
new institutions—however legitimate from some abstract
normative standpoint—are ‗built on quicksand‘ and that
unless the new claim of political authority is matched with
effective power; during these times, ‗power and authority‘
is a kind of composite, a sociological datum that fuses
facticity (the capacity to coerce, compel, or oblige) with
validity (the authority to legitimate, rationalize, or
normalize).20
Bhuta further notes that:
The authority claimed for power is predicated on a claim to
legitimacy, but only if the claim is successful can effective
power translate into stable domination—a state capable of
consistently maintaining its power and authority. In the
stabilization of a state order, cognitive, voluntary ‗consent‘
of each and every subject to the claimed authority for the
exercise of power is less significant than the empirically
general acquiescence of the population in the means by
which power is exercised and commands enforced (or
permissions granted).21
The traditional view of governmental legitimacy and the factors listed
in the Tinoco opinion mention nothing about the way the government
in question came to power, and do not take into account the character
of the government itself as being relevant to the question of
legitimacy.
However, there is strong evidence that state practice and opinio
juris22 have coalesced into an increasingly important norm providing
19. Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica, 1 R.I.A.A. 369, 382 (1923).
20. Nehal Bhuta, New Modes and Orders: The Difficulties of a Jus Post Bellum of
Constitutional Transformation, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 799, 831 (2010) (footnote omitted).
21. Id. at 830 (footnote omitted).
22. Customary international law is generally understood to be demonstrated by state
practice and opinio juris. See, e.g., The North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. Rep. of Ger./
Den.; Fed. Rep. of Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 78 (Feb. 20) (―Not only must the acts
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that the character of a government, and the way it comes to power,
are relevant to whether or not that government is recognized as
―legitimate‖ under international law. The clearest examples of this
are when the international community, whether under the aegis of the
United Nations or through regional organizations like the OAS, has
condemned efforts by the military to subvert and overthrow
democratic governments.23 Recently, the OAS suspended Honduras
following what many considered a coup against the country‘s
democratically elected president.24
As Franck discussed, one of the first and clearest examples of
this principle in action was the international reaction to the overthrow
of Haiti‘s democratically elected president, Jean Bertrand-Aristide. In
1991, Aristide was overwhelmingly elected president of Haiti in free
and fair elections monitored by the United Nations.25 In September of
that year, Aristide was overthrown in a coup led by the Haitian
military.26 The international community was unanimous in
recognizing that the military coup against the democratically elected
government of Haiti would not be allowed to stand. The OAS
immediately condemned the coup, and passed a resolution
recognizing the elected government of President Aristide to be ―the
only legitimate representatives of the Government of Haiti.‖27 The
OAS foreign ministers also issued a declaration stating that no
government resulting from this illegal situation would be accepted
and urging OAS member states to freeze the assets of the Haitian
government and impose a trade embargo on Haiti.28

concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or carried out in such a
way, as to be evidence as a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of
a rule of law requiring it.‖).
23. Organization of American States [OAS], Support of the Democratic Government of
Haiti, OEA/Ser.F/V.1/MRE/RES.1 (Oct. 3, 1991); Press Release, OAS, OAS Suspends
Honduras (July 5, 2009), available at http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp
?sCodigo=E-219/09.
24. The case of Honduras is somewhat unusual because the coup had a least a modicum
of legal justification, having been partially legitimized by the Honduran Supreme Court. Paul
Kiernan et al., Coup Rocks Honduras, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2009, at A1.
25. BRAD R. ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 367 (1999).
26. Id. at 366–67.
27. Support of the Democratic Government of Haiti, supra note 23.
28. OAS, Apoyo a la Democracia en Haiti [Support for the Democracy in Haiti],
OEA/Ser.F/V.1/MRE/RES.2/91 (Oct. 8, 1991), available at http://www.oas.org/columbus/
docs/HaitiMRERES291Spa.pdf.
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Additionally, the United Nations opposed the military coup in
Haiti and supported the Aristide government. In 1992, the United
Nations Credentials Committee rejected the credentials of the Haitian
military regime and recognized the right of President Aristide‘s
government to continue to represent Haiti.29 The UN General
Assembly condemned the coup‘s ―illegal replacement of the
constitutional President of Haiti, the use of violence and military
coercion and the violation of human rights.‖30 The General Assembly
further affirmed as unacceptable ―any entity resulting from that
illegal situation‖ and demanded ―the immediate restoration of the
legitimate government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, together
with the full application of the National Constitution.‖31
In 1994, the UN Security Council determined that the overthrow
of the democratically elected Aristide government in Haiti
represented a ―threat to peace and security in the region‖ and
authorized a multinational force to ―facilitate the departure from Haiti
of the military leadership‖ and usher in the ―the prompt return of the
legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate
authorities of the Government of Haiti.‖32
In 1997, the international community again acted to oppose a
military coup against a democratically elected government, this time
in Sierra Leone. In that year, a group of soldiers overthrew the
government of Ahmed Kabbah, Sierra Leone‘s first democratically
elected president.33 The Organization for African Unity (OAU)
condemned the coup and supported efforts by the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to take military
action to restore the elected government.34 The United Nations also
acted to condemn the coup, allowing the elected Kabbah government
to retain its seat in the General Assembly.35 The UN Security Council
passed Resolution 1132, invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter and

29. Griffin, supra note 16, at 746.
30. G.A. Res. 46/7, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/7 (Oct. 11, 1991).
31. Id. ¶ 2.
32. S.C. Res. 940, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (July 31, 1994).
33. See Karsten Nowrot & Emily W. Schbacker, The Use of Force to Restore
Democracy: International Legal Implications of the ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Leone,
14 AM. U. INT‘L L. REV. 321, 323 (1998).
34. Id. at 328.
35. Credentials Comm., Rep. on its 52nd Sess., ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/52/719 (Dec. 11,
1997).
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demanding that the military junta ―take immediate steps to relinquish
power in Sierra Leone and make way for the restoration of the
democratically elected Government and a return to constitutional
order.‖36
II. THE
EMERGING
CONVENTIONS

DEMOCRATIC

NORM—INTERNATIONAL

One of the sources of customary international law is state
practice,37 and state practice, as demonstrated by the conduct of
organizations like the UN and the OAS with respect to Haiti, Sierra
Leone, and Honduras, clearly establishes a growing customary
international legal norm in favor of democratic governance.38
Another important source of international law are international
conventions and the principles embodied therein.39 Customary
international law clearly establishes that a pattern of international
agreements all standing for the same proposition can demonstrate that
a practice is so widely followed that it has become a rule of
customary international law40 and numerous international
conventions form a body of opinio juris and state practice that
enshrine the increasingly universal customary international norm of
36. S.C. Res. 1132, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1132 (Oct. 8, 1997).
37. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 183
(June 27) (observing that the Court must consider ―practice and opinio juris of States‖).
38. See supra Part II. The recent international reaction to the military coup in the West
African nation of Mali is further evidence of this trend. On March 21, 2012, a group of
officers overthrew the elected government of President Amadou Toumani Touré. On April 6,
2012, after widespread international condemnation and the imposition of trade and economic
sanctions by ECOWAS, the ruling junta agreed to step down in favor of a transitional
civilian government that will be tasked with organizing free elections. Mali coup leaders to
stand down as part of ECOWAS deal, BBC NEWS, Apr. 6, 2012. www.bbc.co.uk/news/world
-africa-17642276.
39. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), 33 U.N.T.S 993.
Article 38 reads as follows: The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.
Id.
40. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. Rep. of Ger./Den.; Fed. Rep. of
Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 73–74 (Feb. 20).
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democratic governance. Numerous international conventions,
including several to which the Islamic Republic of Iran is party, have
increasingly enshrined the norm of democratic governance and
genuine, periodic elections. Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UNDHR) states that ―everyone has the right to take
part in the government of his country, directly or through freely
chosen representatives‖ where ―the will of the people shall be the
basis of the authority of government‖ and more precisely that ―this
will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall
be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or
by equivalent free voting procedures.‖41
Numerous regional conventions also enshrine the norm in favor
of democratic governance. The Organization of American States
Charter has several provisions to ensure the vitality of representative
government, including the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and
the Renewal of the Inter-American system, giving special priority to
―strengthening representative democracy as an expression of the
legitimate and free manifestation of the will of the people.‖42 In 1991
the OAS passed Resolution 1080, which requires the organization‘s
Secretary General to call for an immediate meeting if there is a
―sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political
institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of power by the
democratically elected government in any of the Organization‘s
member states.‖43 Furthermore, Resolution 1080 establishes a
specific procedure for defending democracy against the military
coups that have plagued Latin American for decades, as happened in
countries such as Haiti, Peru, Guatemala and Honduras.44 In 1992 the
OAS amended its charter with the Protocol of Washington, which
requires the suspension of any OAS government whose regime came
to power through a coup or by otherwise overthrowing a
41. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III), art. 21 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
42. See OAS, Inter-American Democratic Charter, arts. 17–22, G.A. Res. 1, OAS Doc.
OEA/Ser.P/AG/RES/1 (XXVIII-E/01) (Sept. 11, 2001) (detailing collective action
mechanism to preserve at-risk state‘s ―democratic system‖); OAS Gen. Assembly
Proceedings, 21st Sess., Volume 1, at 2, OAS/Ser.P/XXI.O.2 (June 4, 1991) (reprinting The
Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System),
available at http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/agres/ag03805E01.pdf.
43. OAS, Representative Democracy, G.A. Res. 1080, ¶ 1, OAS Doc. AG/RES/1080
(XXI-O/91) (June 5, 1991).
44. See generally Stephen J. Schnably, The Santiago Commitment as a Call to
Democracy in the United States: Evaluating the OAS Role in Haiti, Peru, and Guatemala, 25
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 393 (1994).
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democratically elected government.45 Article 3 of the First Protocol
to the European Convention on Human Rights provides that ―the
High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at
reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will
ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice
of the legislature.‖46 Article 23 of the American Convention
guarantees that every citizen shall have the right to ―take part in the
conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives‖ and to ―vote and to be elected in genuine periodic
elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and by
secret ballot that guarantees the free expression of the will of the
voters.‖47 Article 13 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples‘
Rights contains similar language, guaranteeing ―every citizen shall
have the right to participate freely in the government of his country,
either directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance
with the provisions of the law.‖48
Perhaps the most important international convention with respect
to the importance of maintaining democratic norms is the ICCPR, to
which Iran has been a state party since 1975.49 Article 25 of the
ICCPR guarantees that every citizen shall have the right and the
opportunity ―to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or
through freely chosen representatives‖ and ―to vote and to be elected
at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal
suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free
expression of the will of the electors.‖50 The ICCPR also guarantees
important freedoms, such as: due process rights,51 the right to

45. OAS, Protocol of Amendments to the Charter of the Organization of American
States (Protocol of Washington), G.A. Amend. 56, art. I, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.A/2 Add. 3
(SEPF) (Dec. 14, 1992) (adding Article 9 to the OAS Charter, which provides that ―[a]
Member of the Organization whose democratically constituted government has been
overthrown by force may be suspended from the exercise of the right to participate‖ in
OAS).
46. Protocol to Amend the Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 3, opened for signature Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262.
47. OAS, American Convention on Human Rights art. 23(1), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S.
No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 144.
48. Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights art.
13(1), June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217.
49. ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 25.
50. Id. art. 25(a)–(b).
51. Id. art. 14.
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freedom of assembly,52 freedom of association,53 and freedom of
expression.54
In addition to violating the general customary norm in favor of
democratic elections embodied in international conventions, Iran has
also repeatedly violated its own specific obligations under Article 25
of the ICCPR. While Article 25‘s requirement for ―genuine‖ elections
is somewhat ambiguous, it seems certain that, at a minimum, a
―genuine‖ election would have to be one where the victor was not
determined in advance and where the ballots cast are fairly counted.
Furthermore, for it to be an election in the literal sense there would
have to be two or more candidates for a given position, or at least a
reasonable opportunity for opposition candidates to enter the race. To
take two extreme examples, it seems certain that elections in North
Korea, or in Saddam Hussein‘s Iraq, would not qualify as ―genuine‖
under the ICCPR. Parliamentary elections in North Korea have been
described as:
[L]argely a formality, since only one candidate is listed on
the ballot in each constituency. Officially, the vote is secret.
But those who oppose the sole candidate must go to a
special booth to cross out the name before placing it in a
ballot box—an act of rebellion defectors say is all but
unthinkable.55
Similarly, in Saddam Hussein‘s Iraq, Iraqis were required to cast
ballots—in their own blood—in a 2002 referendum on confirming
Saddam‘s rule.56
Under this interpretation, Iran has been in violation of Article 25
of the ICCPR for nearly 37 years, since Iran acceded to the
convention in 1975. In 1975, the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza
Pahlavi, abolished Iran‘s multi-party system (which had itself been a
farce since the overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953) and
replaced it with a one party system under the aegis of the Rastakhiz

52. Id. art. 21.
53. Id. art. 22.
54. Id. art. 19.
55. Jean H. Lee, North Korea „Votes‟ for New Parliament, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 8, 2009,
http://www.thestar.com/News/World/article/598600.
56. David Blair, Iraqis vote in blood for Saddam, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 16, 2002, 12:01
AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/1410387/Iraqis-vote-inblood-for-Saddam.html.
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(Resurgence) Party.57 All Iranians were required by law to become
members of the party, and refusal to do so was essentially deemed
treasonous—those not wishing to join the party were supposed to be
offered their passports and a passage to exile.58
Following the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, Iran‘s political
system has changed to make meaningful democracy nearly
impossible. For instance, a Guardian Council determines in advance
which candidates are ideologically acceptable and may stand in Iran‘s
presidential and parliamentary elections.59 Furthermore, millions of
Iranians continue to believe that, in addition to tilting the playing
field against opposition candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi, the Islamic
Republic falsified the 2009 presidential election results to show a
victory for its favored candidate, thus making the election a farce
even by the Islamic Republic‘s own standards.60
III. DEMOCRACY AND RELIGION
Parts I and II of this paper have established that there is an
increasingly universal customary international legal norm in favor of
democratic governance.61 This norm is embodied in state practice and
numerous international conventions.62 Part III established that Iran,
by failing to hold genuine elections, is in violation of this norm and
its own specific treaty obligations under the International Convention
on Civil and Political Rights.63 This section discusses the steps Iran
must take in order to meet its obligations under customary
international law and treaties such as the ICCPR.
57. SIR ANTHONY PARSONS, THE PRIDE AND THE FALL: IRAN 1974–1979, at 16 (1984).
58. Id.
59. See KARIM SADJADPOUR, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT‘L PEACE, READING
KHAMENEI: THE WORLD VIEW OF IRAN‘S MOST POWERFUL LEADER 7 (2009), available at
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/sadjadpour
_iran_final2.pdf.
60. Since there has never been an independent, impartial audit of the 2009 Iranian
presidential election results, it may be some time before it is clear what happened in June of
2009. In addition to violating its Article 25 obligations, the Islamic Republic has also
violated virtually every other provision of the ICCPR, including the right to a fair trial, the
prohibition on torture, and the rights to freedom of assembly and expression. For
documentation of these abuses, particularly those that have occurred since Iran‘s disputed
presidential election, see IRAN HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CENTER, A YEAR LATER:
SUPPRESSION CONTINUES IN IRAN (2010), available at http://www.iranhrdc.org/
english/publications/reports/3162-a-year-later-suppression-continues-in-iran.html.
61. See supra Parts I–II.
62. See supra Part II.
63. See supra Part II.
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Unlike some of the world‘s more notorious recent dictatorships
such as Ba‘athist Iraq, North Korea, or Communist Cuba, Iran is a
comparatively open and pluralistic society. Indeed, Iran‘s constitution
guarantees many important civil, political, and economic rights, and
in its early drafts was based largely on the Constitution of the French
Fifth Republic.64 However, the draft constitution was modified
numerous times during the turbulent early days after the Iranian
Revolution, in each case to grant more power to the Iranian clergy,
who were slowly winning the battle for post-revolutionary control.65
The process, through which the democratic ambitions of the
1979 revolution became fused with the Ayatollah Khomeini‘s
totalitarian theocratic vision, is a fascinating one,66 and these dueling,
irreconcilable impulses are reflected in Iran‘s constitution. The
Constitution of the Islamic Republic grants the Supreme Leader
(whose title more accurately translates as ―Leader of the Revolution‖)
extraordinary powers over the levers of state and charges him with
defending the ideals of the Islamic Revolution.67 The Supreme
Leader has the power to appoint members of: the judiciary, state
radio and television, Iran‘s armed forces, the Revolutionary Guards
and the Guardian Council, which has the authority to veto
parliamentary decisions it believes conflict with Islam and to bar
ideologically unsuitable candidates from running in Iranian
elections.68
These broad powers effectively grant one person either the direct
or indirect power over Iran‘s executive, legislative, and judicial
branches and make the Islamic Republic a de jure dictatorship.69
Granting any one official such extraordinary, unreviewable powers
64. See infra notes 72–79 and accompanying text. See also Omar Sial, A Guide to the
Legal System of the Islamic Republic of Iran, NYU LAW GLOBAL (Mar. 2006),
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Iran.htm.
65. Sial, supra note 64.
66. For a history of the machinations that went into drafting and adopting of Iran‘s
current constitution, see Said Saffari, The Legitimation of the Clergy‟s Right to Rule in the
Iranian Constitution of 1979, 20 BRIT. J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 64 (1993).
67. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 110.
68. See SADJADPOUR, supra note 60.
69. The Islamic Republic‘s constitution does state that the legislative, executive and
judiciary branches of government are intended to be separate. However, it also states that all
three branches of government will be supervised by the absolute authority of the Supreme
Leader and the clergy. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 57.
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would make democratic governance virtually impossible. However,
the Constitution of the Islamic Republic also requires that the
Supreme Leader be a member of the clergy, making the country a de
jure theocracy.70
In spite of this broad grant of authority, Iran‘s constitution
appears at a glance to be in many ways a surprisingly democratic and
progressive document, barring discrimination on the basis of ethnic
affiliation,71 sex,72 and providing guarantees for the rights of
women.73 Iran‘s constitution also provides for many civil and
political rights, including freedom of the press74, freedom of
assembly,75 privacy protections,76 and a specific ban on the use of
torture by the government.77 The constitution of Iran also provides
for a democratically elected president.78
However, virtually all these civil and political rights are
specifically qualified by the requirement that they exist only so far as
they do not ―conflict with the principles of Islam.‖79 As a matter of
law and custom, the Supreme Leader, his subordinates, and clerical
bodies such as the Guardian Council are charged with interpreting
how Islamic doctrine applies to Iranian constitutional rights.80 Indeed,
70. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 109. Iran‘s original Islamic Constitution, adopted in
1980, required the Supreme Leader to be a marja, the highest rank achievable for a Shi‘a
Muslim clergyman. SADJADPOUR, supra note 60, at 6. Iran‘s constitution was amended in
1989 to remove this requirement in part to allow Iran‘s current Supreme Leader, Ali
Khamenei, who was a mid-level clergyman at the time of time of his elevation to Leader, to
take over the office from Ayatollah Khomeini upon his death. Id.
71. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 19.
72. Id. art. 20.
73. Id. art. 21.
74. Id. art. 24.
75. Id. art. 27.
76. Id. art. 25.
77. Id. art. 38. Article 38 of Iran‘s constitution also appears to bestow a privilege against
self-incrimination, although in practice this guarantee is virtually never honored, and coerced
confessions are extremely common. See generally ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN, TORTURED
CONFESSIONS: PRISONS AND PUBLIC RECANTATIONS IN MODERN IRAN (1999).
78. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 114.
79. Id. arts. 4, 20–21, 26–28.
80. See Edward Yeranian, Iran‟s Supreme Leader Says He Represents the Prophet
Muhammad on Earth, VOA (July, 21, 2010), http://www.voanews.com/english/news/
middle-east/Irans-Supreme-Leader-Says-He-Represents-Prophet-Muhammad-on-Earth98945624.html.
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the Ayatollah Khamenei has gone as far as to declare that his power
is absolute, and that all must ―obey him‖ since he speaks as the
―representative of the Prophet Muhammad and [Shi‘ism‘s] 12th
Imam on Earth.‖81 By qualifying fundamental constitutional rights by
stating that they are subject to the whims of a megalomaniac who
literally claims to be God‘s Prophet on Earth, the Constitution of the
Islamic Republic makes those guarantees virtually meaningless.
Furthermore, given the hideous human rights record of the Islamic
regime82 it seems extraordinarily unlikely that the Supreme Leader
and his subordinates will use the process of Islamic interpretation to
expand civil and political rights.
In addition to granting the Supreme Leader and his associates
warrant to suppress any dissent in the name of religious authority,83
any constitution with a theocratic foundation necessarily grants
officials of state the power to enforce, at their whim, prejudices
against religious minorities and women. While Iran has an ancient
and noble tradition of respect for other cultures and religions, 84 the
Islamic regime has long persecuted members of the Baha‘i faith on
81. Id.
82. IRAN HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CTR., supra note 61.
83. Iranians who opposed the Islamic Republic, and in particular those who oppose the
imposition of the Velayat-e-Faqih are not considered enemies of the state as such, but
heretics. Iranian dissidents brought to trial are typically charged with Moharebeh (waging
war against God) or the related crime of Mofsed-e-filarz (sowing corruption on earth). Both
crimes are punishable by death. See, e.g., Peter Walker, Iranian Court Jails Human Rights
Activist for „Waging War Against God‟, GUARDIAN, Sept. 19, 2010, http://www.guardian.co
.uk/world/2010/sep/19/iranian-court-jails-human-rights-activist; Neil MacFarquhar, Iran‟s
Leader Derides Protests; Lawmakers Urge Death for Opposition Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
16, 2011, at A1. Velayat-e-Faqih, typically translated as ―Rule of the Jurisprudent‖ or
―Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists‖, is the state ideology of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
While historically the concept had given the Islamic clergy custodianship of the poor and
insane, the Ayatollah Khomeini expanded this idea to include everyone living in an Islamic
society, positing that a high ranking Islamic scholar should interpret Islam for all members
of society in all matters. The concept is a highly controversial interpretation of Shi‘a Islamic
teachings and is not by any means universally accepted, even by high ranking Shi‘a
clergymen such as the Ayatollah Sistani.
84. Shirin Ebadi, in her speech accepting the 2003 Nobel Peace Prize, commented on
Iran‘s ancient tradition of tolerance and respect for other cultures:
I am an Iranian. A descendent of Cyrus the Great. The very emperor who
proclaimed at the pinnacle of power 2500 years ago that ―. . . he would not
reign over the people if they did not wish it. And [he] promised not to force any
person to change his religion and faith and guaranteed freedom for all.‖ The
Charter of Cyrus the Great is one of the most important documents that should
be studied in the history of human rights.
Shirin Ebadi, Nobel Lecture at the Nobel Institute (Dec. 10, 2003) (transcript available at
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2003/ebadi-lecture-e.html).
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religious grounds.85 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic, while
granting religious freedom to Zoroastrians, Christians, and Jews,
intentionally refuses to recognize the rights of Baha‘is.86
Having said all this, authors such as Alfred Stepan argue that
even though a country‘s laws and customs enshrine religious
elements, this does not necessarily preclude successful, pluralistic
democracy. Stepan correctly argued that many democratic countries,
particularly those in Western Europe, have carved out a role for
religion in society without allowing doctrinaire theocracy to
overwhelm the public sphere.87 For instance Greece, a deeply
religious country88 and incidentally the birthplace of democracy, has
enshrined a role for its own Eastern Orthodox faith in the Greek
constitution while still maintaining a pluralistic democracy. 89 In the
United Kingdom, the British monarch is not only the head of the
armed forces, but also the leader of the Church of England, and in
many English schools, church doctrine is taught not only as history,
but as divine truth.90 Countries like Germany and Austria permit local
85. For a recent history of persecution of Iranian Baha‘is, see generally IRAN HUMAN
RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CTR., A FAITH DENIED: THE PERSECUTION OF THE BAHÁ‘ÍS OF IRAN
(2006),
http://www.iranhrdc.org/english/publications/reports/3149-a-faith-denied-thepersecution-of-the-baha-is-of-iran.html; IRAN HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CTR.,
COMMUNITY UNDER SIEGE: THE ORDEAL OF THE BAHÁ‘ÍS OF SHIRAZ (2007), http://
www.iranhrdc.org/english/publications/reports/3151-community-under-siege%3A-theordeal-of-the-baha%E2%80%99is-of-shiraz.html. The persecution of Baha‘is in Iran
predates the Islamic Republic, but has always been founded on theological differences.
86. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 13. Islam recognizes the rights of so-called ―People of
the Book,‖ specifically Christians and Jews, whose holy books and revelations predated
Islam, and were later incorporated into Islamic doctrine. Shi‘a Islam as practiced in Iran also
recognizes the rights of Zoroastrians. The nature of the theological warrant for the
persecution of the Baha‘is essentially stems from the fact the Baha‘ism claims as part of its
faith prophets and revelations after those of the Prophet Muhammad. As Islam claims to be
God‘s final and complete revelation to humanity, claiming any divine revelations after the
fact would, from an Islamic perspective, be necessarily false and heretical.
87. Stepan, supra note 11, at 41.
88. Between 95 and 98 percent of Greeks are members of the Eastern Orthodox faith, 81
percent of Greek citizens believe that there is a God, and a further 16 percent believed in
some sort of spirit or life force. DIRECTORATE GEN. PRESS AND COMMC‘N, EUROPEAN
COMM‘N, SPECIAL EUROBAROMETER: SOCIAL VALUES, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 9 (2005),
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_225_report_en.pdf.
89. Indeed, Greece‘s constitution enshrines the role of the Eastern Orthodox Church in
Greek society. 2008 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] 2, art. 3.
90. The author Christopher Hitchens once related a story regarding the teaching of
church doctrine in British schools, as explained by Mrs. Jean Watts, who taught nature class
at Hitchens' boarding school when he was 9 years old. Barbara Bradley Hagerty, for
Hitchens, in Life and Death, an Unaware Cosmos, NPR (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.npr.org
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churches to play an important role in national civic and economic
life.91
Indeed, it seems that democracies that promote an aggressive
brand of secularism are the exception rather than the rule, and often
subscribe to this model of secular organization in a variety of
different ways for reasons peculiar to their own histories. As Stepan
notes, a country like France, with its specific constitutional guarantee
of ―Laïcité‖ evolved its conception of the proper role of the church in
public affairs during the inter-religious turmoil following the French
Revolution, and even so, France still dedicates a large percentage of
its public education budget for Catholic private schools.92 The First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was similarly born out of
religious conflict, and American politicians frequently make public
displays of piety to win support. Finally, the most militant secular
state in the world, the Republic of Turkey, has only developed
towards democracy by allowing the full participation of Islamic
parties, including the current governing party of Turkey, the AKP.
There is a dramatic difference between a constitutional structure
that incorporates religious belief into civic life and one that forcibly
imposes religious doctrine and forbids dissent. The former structure,
even if not explicitly secular, would certainly be consistent with
democratic governance—the latter, as practiced in Iran, would not.
As such, Alfred Stepan‘s definition of democracy could certainly
include a constitutional structure with a religious foundation, or a
secular democracy that permitted competition by religious parties:
Democracy is a system of conflict regulation that allows
open competition over values and goals that citizens want
to advance. In the strict democratic sense, this means that
as long as groups do not use violence, do not violate the
rights of other citizens, and advance their interests within
the rules of the democratic game, all groups are granted the

/2011/12/16/143830372/for-hitchens-in-life-and-death-an-unaware-cosmos. He recalled that
Mrs. Watts explained that God had made the grass and the leaves green as a gift to mankind,
saying that green grass was proof of the glory of God, because He could have made
vegetation ―orange or red, something that would clash with our eyes, whereas green is the
most restful color for our eyes.‖ Id.
91. See Stepan supra note 11, at 41.
92. Id. at 42.

KARIMI MACRO

2012]

5/22/2012 10:16 AM

IRAN, DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

321

right to advance their interests, both in civil society, and in
political society.93
Furthermore, just as there is no inherent conflict between the
inclusion of religion in civic life and the maintenance of democracy,
there is no conflict whatever between particular religions, such as
Islam, and pluralistic democracy. Indeed, Stepan, who wrote his
article years before the Arab Spring, rebuts the false impression that
Islam is incompatible with democracy by noting that a case can be
made that about half of all the world‘s Muslims live in ―democracies,
near-democracies, or intermittent democracies,‖ and that the number
is higher still if one includes Indonesia.94
Finally, there is also nothing in Iran‘s own experience with
democracy that would prevent it from blending together civic and
religious life in a democratic, pluralistic context. Iran can still
preserve an important role for Islam in its constitutional framework
without sacrificing the basic principles of democracy. Indeed, Iran‘s
pre-revolutionary constitution, while certainly imperfect by modern
standards, declared Islam the official state religion and granted the
clergy certain judicial powers, guaranteed the rights of religious
minorities, provided for representative government and sought to
curb the authority of Iran‘s monarchy.95 Prior to the 1953 coup
against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, Iranian nationalists
sought to turn the Iranian monarchy into a purely ceremonial office,
and to preserve a limited role for the clergy in judicial and family

93. Id. at 39.
94. Id. at 48.
95. Contrasting Iran‘s 1906 Constitution with the Constitution of the Islamic Republic is
an interesting case study in how laws and constitutions can be manipulated by autocrats to
serve political ends. The 1906 Constitution, on its surface, actually appears to grant powers
to the clergy that are similar to those granted by the Constitution of the Islamic Republic,
including requirements that government officials be Muslims and the granting of judicial
power to clerics, and contains far less language about civil, political, and women‘s rights.
QANUNI ASSAASSI IRAN [IRANIAN CONSTITUTION] 1906. Iran‘s last monarch, Mohammad
Reza Pahlavi, contemptuous of both liberal democracy and what he perceived to be clerical
reactionaries, largely ignored both the democratic and religious character of Iran‘s
constitution as he sought to build a secular, modern state. See generally ABBAS MILANI, THE
SHAH (2011). After the revolution, Iran‘s mullahs have largely ignored the more progressive
clauses of the Islamic Republic‘s constitution in favor of their own ideological vision. See
supra notes 69–86 and accompanying text.

KARIMI MACRO

322

5/22/2012 10:16 AM

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 27:304

affairs, in a way that would have resembled the systems established
in countries like Germany and the United Kingdom.96
CONCLUSION
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an increasing
trend towards holding democracy as a universal norm, and a trend
towards international de-legitimization of efforts by governments to
subvert democratic institutions and procedures.97 The philosophical
grandfather of this argument was Francis Fukayama, but Thomas
Franck‘s The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, set the
stage for a much broader conversation about whether a right to
democratic governance existed in international law.98 There has also
been an increasing body of treaty law, such as the ICCPR, the ECHR,
the ACHR, the ACHPR, and the OAS Charter, that forms a body of
custom with respect to the universality of democratic norms.99
Given the emerging customary international norm in favor of
democratic governance, the Islamic Republic of Iran has failed to
meet its obligations under this norm, most prominently under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.100 In addition to
failing to hold regular and genuine elections, Iran has failed to respect
other rights essential to the functioning of democracy under the
ICCPR, including freedom of association, freedom of the press, and
the right to a fair trial.101 Iran‘s civic and political structures are equal
to the task of resolving these problems, and there is nothing inherent
in Iranian history or in Islam that would prevent Iran from making a
successful transition to democracy. Finally, while the Iranian political
system would have to change radically in order to accommodate
democratic change, Iran would not necessarily have to go down the
road of rigid secularism in order to build a successful, pluralistic
democracy.102

96. See generally STEPHEN KINZER, ALL THE SHAH‘S MEN: AN AMERICAN COUP AND THE
ROOTS OF MIDDLE EAST TERROR (2003).
97. See supra Part I.
98. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
99. See supra Part II.
100. See supra Part III.
101. See supra Part II.
102. See supra notes 88–95 and accompanying text.

